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The Evolution of Labor Relations Inside a Russian 
Firm During Late Transition:  
Evidence from Personnel Data 
Hartmut Lehmann ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Entwicklung innerbetrieblicher Arbeitsverhältnisse einer russi-
schen Firma in Zeiten der Transformation: Evidenz von Personaldaten«. This 
paper surveys three studies on the internal labor market of one Russian firm 
spanning the years 1997 to 2002 and focusing on three different issues. The 
studies use unique personnel data that were collected by us and that include the 
work history of each employee as well as annual averages of monthly wages 
and total compensation. Since the three studies are part of a larger project on 
internal labor markets in Russia and Ukraine during transition, the paper starts 
off with a general assessment of how the analysis of personnel data from tran-
sition countries can contribute to the general literature on internal labor mar-
kets. After short descriptions of the investigated firm and the personnel data at 
our disposal, the motivation and the pertinent results of the three studies are 
presented. While the first study looks at the question how the costs of a finan-
cial crisis are spread over the workforce and whether incumbent employees are 
sheltered from negative shocks in the economy, the second study is tied to the 
discussion of wage determination in Russia and analyzes the narrower question 
whether local labor market conditions are an important factor in the wage de-
termination process of the firm at hand or whether stable internal labor market 
structures are of primary concern for its human resource managers. The third 
study contributes to the literature on the labor market experience of women in 
transition by analyzing the evolution and the determinants of the gender earn-
ings gap in the firm. 
Keywords: Internal labor markets, wage policies of a firm, gender gap, transi-
tion, personnel data, Russia. 
1. Introduction 
The allocation and organization of labor in firms is a key aspect of modern 
economic life. Improvements in labor productivity are to a large extent the 
result of increased division of labor as Adam Smith has already argued in An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the the Wealth of Nations (see Smith, 
1976 reprint). With increased knowledge, the coordination of disparate special-
ized workers becomes a major task of economic organization (Hayek, 1945, p. 
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520). Workers who perform specialized tasks in the production process have to 
be organized as “teams” that fabricate a good.1 Achieving an efficient alloca-
tion and coordination of specialized workers in a team productive process is 
often unworkable using standard external market arrangements, because it 
requires an exceedingly complicated system of contracts, which usually involve 
side-payments among joint input owners (cf. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). A 
superior, because less complicated and less costly, organization structure than a 
decentralized pricing system entails that someone, the principal, has residual 
control. This principal hires the team of workers, assigns them to positions in 
the firm in which they are most productive, and monitors and rewards their 
performance (Rosen, 1988). Such a structure prevails in modern labor markets, 
where most labor market participants spend their careers in firms that foster 
long-term employment relations (Farber, 1999). 
The employment relationship has a special contractual nature, which stems 
from the inevitable incompleteness of an employment contract.2 While formal 
rules set standards concerning the quantity and quality of work and define work 
conditions (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), implicit agreements, informal rules, 
and customary law shape relational contracts as a result of contractual incom-
pleteness. Implicit contractual terms relating, for example, to performance or 
specific investments are typically not verifiable in court, so that relational con-
tracts have to be self-enforcing, which can be brought about by the repeated 
game structure of employment relationships (Bull, 1987; MacLeod and Mal-
comson, 1989). The personnel policy of a firm reflects the explicit and implicit 
rules of the relational contract. The question of how wage and job dynamics are 
driven by the interaction between external market factors and underlying eco-
nomic conditions (e.g., labor market pressures, incentives, sorting, and labor 
market institutions) on the one hand and firms’ personnel policies on the other 
hand, is at the heart of labor economics. 
A better general understanding of labor market outcomes requires more in-
sight into what happens inside firms, how personnel policies affect labor mar-
ket careers and whether and how such policies are adapted to changes in exter-
nal conditions. Although the employment relation is one of the most important 
                                                             
1  The coordination between specialists of the team can be achieved by external market ar-
rangements or within firms. Depending on coordination costs and the capability to allocate 
rewards among team members in line with their productivity one or the other of these alter-
native contracting forms prevails. This idea can be traced to Ronald Coase, who, rather than 
dwelling on aspects of team production, proposed in his influential 1937 article “The Na-
ture of the Firm” (Coase, 1937) that firms exist whenever using markets to form contracts is 
more costly. Arrow (1974) added that organizations evolve when markets fail or where 
markets do not exist. Williamson (1975, 1979) later formalized Coase’s cost argument. He 
showed that differential transaction costs are crucial for the allocation of economic activity 
between the firm and the market. 
2  Incompleteness can result from bounded rationality (Simon, 1951) and transaction costs 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
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contractual relationships in economic life, most research areas in labor eco-
nomics treat the firm as a black box and reduce the employment relationship to 
a few key variables as, e.g., to a wage profile. 
Modern labor economics had surprisingly little to say about the complex ac-
tivities inside firms until the emergence of personnel economics – defined as 
the use of economics to address questions relating to internal labor markets, 
incentives, compensation, promotion, performance evaluation, recruitment, 
turnover, and other human resource practices – as an important subfield of 
labor economics (see Lazear, 1999; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a). The inter-
est in the internal workings of firms was particularly sparked by studies of 
personnel records by Lazear (1992) and especially by Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
strom (1994a,b). They focused on career and wage dynamics in a large U.S. 
service sector firm and generated evidence that is inconsistent with simple 
models of learning and incentives and difficult to reconcile with standard labor 
market models. Although early theoretical contributions to the literatures on 
human capital, selection and sorting, and incentives are capable of explaining 
single findings, none of these models is consistent with the collage of evidence 
that has emerged from the subsequent empirical literature which explored 
whether the findings of Baker et al. (1994a, b) hold for other firms operating in 
different advanced market economies, different industries and during different 
periods (see Ariga, Ohkusa, and Brunello, 1999; Seltzer and Merrett, 2000; 
Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Treble et al.,2001; Dohmen and Pfann, 2004; Doh-
men, Kriechel and Pfann, 2004; Dohmen, 2004; Gibbs and Hendricks, 2004; 
and Lin, 2005.) 
The broad picture that has emerged in the literature indicates that career 
paths are important for the allocation of workers to jobs, and that job mobility 
is a major determinant of wage dynamics. Several stylized facts concerning 
compensation and promotion policies and their effect on workers’ career and 
wage dynamics emerge from existing empirical work: First, promotion fast 
tracks exist, i.e. workers who are promoted quickly from one level to the next 
are more likely to be promoted again (see Baker et al. 1994a, Ariga et al. 1999, 
Seltzer and Merrett 2000, Dohmen et al. 2004, Gibbs and Hendricks 2004). 
Second, nominal wage cuts, even after a demotion, are rare (Dohmen, 2004; 
Bewley, 2004). Third, wage increases are serially correlated and predict pro-
motions (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2004). Fourth, the wage premium that workers 
receive upon promotion to a higher job level is large compared to pay raises 
without promotion but typically amounts to only a fraction of the difference 
between average wages of adjacent levels. This is a universal finding in all 
personnel data sets that have been analyzed in the studies mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. Dohmen (2004) shows how such wage dynamics arise in a 
formal salary system, in which part of the rewards of a promotion comes in the 
form of contractually promised future wage increases. Such backloading of 
wages helps fostering long-term employment relationships. Fifth, within-job 
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wage growth is limited by pay ranges so that upward job mobility is crucial for 
sustained wage growth (see Dohmen, 2004). Sixth, demotions are much less 
frequent than promotions (see, e.g., Baker et al. 1994a; Treble et al., 2001). In 
addition, Dohmen et al. (2004) as well as Hamilton et al. (2004) find that pro-
motion rates increase during corporate expansion and fall during downsizing. 
Seventh, promotions and wage increases are more likely with higher perform-
ance evaluations. Finally, studies typically find no evidence of very strict and 
distinct ports of entry and exit as predicted by Doeringer and Piore (1971), but 
workers are typically hired into lower levels of the firm hierarchy. 
These findings have motivated theorists to develop models that amalgamate 
several theoretical concepts, including, e.g., human capital accumulation, job 
assignment, and learning, in order to explain the pattern of evidence (e.g., 
Demougin and Siow, 1994; Bernhardt, 1995; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999b 
and 2002; Dohmen, 2005). Dohmen (2005) analyzes job mobility and wage 
dynamics when workers are assigned to limited job slots in a corporate hierar-
chy. The model derives a dependence relation between changes in the size of 
the workforce and internal job mobility rates. It yields predictions that are 
consistent with the empirical evidence found in Dohmen et al. (2004). Since 
the model focuses explicitly on the impact of changes in economic conditions 
on internal labor market careers, it is especially relevant in the context of tran-
sition. 
Empirical work that uses personnel data to test these new theories or that 
provides further stylized empirical facts, from which new theoretical work can 
originate, is still rare. We were able to gather personnel data from Russian and 
Ukrainian firms were collected for the transition period 1990 to 2006. These 
data provide additional data points that help in the solution of thus far unre-
solved puzzles in the literature. 
The analysis of the personnel files from the Russian and Ukrainian firms 
makes scientific progress possible in several other respects as well. First, we 
can examine whether the stylized facts that were uncovered for firms from 
advanced western economies hold true for a firm in transition, and the data 
allow us to assess in what respects the internal economics of the firm differ 
from the functioning of western internal labor markets. Second, the personnel 
data of a firm operating during the transition from a centrally-planned to a 
market economy are extremely well suited for shedding light on the question of 
whether and how changes in external labor market conditions affect explicit 
personnel administrative rules, as well as procedures and implicit agreements 
that govern the organization of labor in the firm. This is relevant for the more 
fundamental issue of whether such rules and custom, e.g., formal salary sys-
tems, constrain the allocation of workers, i.e. affect their career and wage dy-
namics beyond labor market factors or whether administrative rules simply 
reflect underlying wage and promotion dynamics and thus play no additional 
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role. Third, we can analyze turnover, internal job mobility and wage dynamics 
during periods of reorganization and restructuring. 
Most of the raised important research topics in the field of personnel eco-
nomics in transition have not yet been studied since the mentioned data sets 
have only become available at the time of writing. Our review here, therefore, 
reports on three studies that were undertaken with a more limited data set of 
one Russian firm for the period 1997 to 2002, which relates to late transition in 
Russia, but also encompasses the Russian financial crisis in 1998.3 
The paper has the following structure. In the next section we describe the 
firm in some detail. This is followed by a description of the personnel data that 
are analyzed from different angles. The following three sections then present 
the main findings, while a concluding section provides an assessment of what 
have we learned thus far about internal labor markets in Russia.  
2. The analyzed firm 
Our firm operates in one of the central Russian oblasts in the “machine build-
ing and metal works” sector and produces equipment for gas and oil production 
and smith-press equipment. It was part of the military industrial complex be-
fore transition but has converted its production portfolio completely to products 
for the civilian economy. The firm operates in a product market that is charac-
terized as follows: 6.2% of its output is destined for export, mainly to countries 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), so the vast majority of its 
products is for the Russian market. In this market it has more than 5 competi-
tors, among them firms from the EU. 
The firm was founded in the 1950s and privatized in 1992. By 2002 em-
ployees and managers owned 53.1% of the shares, while former employees and 
other Russian nationals owned 21.5% and 25.4% respectively. From interviews 
with the CEO it, however, transpires that top management has a decisive ma-
jority and that employees have no voting rights. Also, while there is collective 
bargaining on paper at this firm, trade union officials follow the directives of 
top management. Finally, dividend payments to the workforce are very small 
relative to annual compensation. These facts imply that corporate governance 
structures neither give employees influence over wage setting nor do they 
confound the relative structure of wages in the firm over time. 
                                                             
3  These studies are (1) Thomas Dohmen, Hartmut Lehmann and Mark Schaffer (2008) 
“Wage policies of a Russian Firm and the financial crisis of 1998: Evidence from personnel 
data – 1997 to 2002;” (2) Thomas Dohmen, Hartmut Lehmann and Mark Schaffer (2009) 
“Wage determination and wage inequality inside a Russian firm in late transition: Evidence 
from personnel data – 1997 to 2002;” and (3) Thomas Dohmen, Hartmut Lehmann and An-
zelika Zaiceva (2008) “The gender earnings gap inside a Russian firm: first evidence from 
personnel data – 1997 to 2002.” 
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Figure 1: Profitability (profit/sales in %) 
 
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of profits relative to sales for the firm and the average 
percentage of profits to sales for the machine building and metal working sector.  
Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
Table 1: Composition of Workforce (in %), 1997 to 2002 
Year 
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers Total 
Absolute 
number 
of 
employ-
ees 
1997 7.1 24.8 62.1 2.2 3.8 100 3032 
1998 7.0 24.4 62.6 2.1 3.8 100 3081 
1999 6.9 24.6 62.6 2.1 3.8 100 3077 
2000 7.0 24.4 62.8 2.1 3.8 100 3110 
2001 6.9 24.0 63.2 2.0 3.8 100 3175 
2002 6.9 23.7 63.6 1.9 3.8 100 3221 
Notes: The table shows the composition of the workforce in terms of the five employee cate-
gories in percentages. The absolute number of employees is displayed in the rightmost col-
umn. 
Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
How representative is our firm in the manufacturing sector? Two hostile 
takeover attempts tell us that the firm must have been performing well. In terms 
of profits and employment our firm is certainly not representative of its sector 
or of the Russian economy as a whole as figure 1 and the last column of table 1 
demonstrate. While in the sector profits fall substantially they are stable and 
predominantly rising in the firm. Employment in the sector was characterized 
by a large fall in the reported period while it is stable and even slightly rising. 
Also the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) can be found in the list of Russia’s top 
1000 managers as he has successfully converted his firm from military to civil-
ian production. So, all in all, our firm is part of a small but important part of 
 340
Russian industry that has managed transition well; and is not representative of 
the industrial sector at large. 
3. The personnel data 
The construction of the personnel data proceeded as follows. We created an 
electronic file based on records from the personnel archive of the firm, and 
constructed a year-end panel data set for the years 1997 to 2002.4 We have 
records of all employees who were employed at any time during this period.5 
The data contain information on individuals’ demographic characteristics such 
as gender, age, marital status and number of children, on their educational 
attainment, retraining and other skill enhancement activities before joining the 
firm and during tenure at the firm. We also know the exact date when each 
employee started work at the firm as well as his/her complete working history 
before that date. We can trace each employee’s career within the firm. In addi-
tion we also know whether someone worked full-time or part-time. For those 
who separated from the firm we can distinguish between voluntary quit, trans-
fer to another firm, individual dismissal, group dismissal and retirement. 
In Russian firms the workforce is often divided into five employee catego-
ries: administration (i.e., management) which we label “managers”; accounting 
and financial specialists whom we label “accountants”; engineering and techni-
cal specialists (including programmers) whom we subsume under the term 
“engineers”; primary and auxiliary production workers, whom we label “pro-
duction workers”; and finally, service staff.6 
For the years 1997 to 2002 we have monthly wages averaged over the year, 
and information on the three types of bonuses paid to the workforce: (1) a 
monthly bonus amounting to a fixed percentage of the wage; (2) an extra an-
nual bonus whose level depends on “the results of the year” (i.e., a form of 
profit sharing); (3) an annual bonus labeled “other bonus”. While production 
workers never receive a monthly bonus, the bonus labeled “other bonus” is 
paid to production workers only. Wages are reported by the firm as the em-
ployee’s average monthly wage in rubles for the year (or fraction of the year, if 
not employed for the full 12 months), with no adjustment for inflation. The 
monthly bonus is reported as a percentage of the average monthly wage, and 
the corresponding ruble figure is recovered by applying the percentage to the 
nominal monthly wage. The other two bonuses are reported in nominal rubles. 
                                                             
4  We have also wage data for all months in 2003 except for December. However, since we 
also lack data on yearly bonuses for 2003, we do not use the compensation data for 2003 in 
this paper. 
5  Information for top managers is missing for reasons of confidentiality. 
6  Only production workers are subdivided into levels, primary production workers having 
eight and auxiliary production workers having six levels. 
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The inflation rate in Russia during this period was irregular and sometimes 
quite high – the price level more than doubled between the start of the financial 
crisis in July 1998 and April 1999, and was 0-2% per month before and after – 
and so some care is required to construct appropriate deflators. Because nomi-
nal average monthly wage and the nominal monthly bonus are averages for the 
year, they are deflated into 1997 constant rubles using an annual average CPI, 
i.e., the average price level for the year relative to the average price level in 
1997. The other two bonuses are paid around the end of the year, and so these 
are converted into 1997 constant rubles using the CPI price level for December 
of the corresponding year, i.e., the December price level in that year relative to 
the average 1997 price level.  
Table 2 Distribution of components of average real monthly compensation 
Year Monthly Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra 
Bonus 
Other 
Bonus 
Average 
monthly 
compensation 
1997 0.830 0.080 0.051 0.039 1.635 
1998 0.916 0.059 0.000 0.025 1.559 
1999 0.870 0.066 0.043 0.021 1.131 
2000 0.854 0.066 0.042 0.038 1.165 
2001 0.797 0.081 0.098 0.025 1.315 
2002 0.776 0.095 0.088 0.041 1.395 
Notes: Monthly bonus is a fixed percentage of the wage, which is not paid out to workers. 
Extra bonus is a premium paid out to all employees, which depends on the results of the year. 
Other bonus is paid out to workers only, for special effort and overtime. Monthly wage and 
monthly bonus are deflated into 1997 constant rubles using an annual average CPI, extra 
bonus and other bonus are converted into 1997 constant rubles using the CPI price level for 
December of the corresponding year. Average monthly compensation is given in thousand of 
1997 rubles. 
 
Table 2 shows that bonuses are only a relatively small fraction of total com-
pensation. We can also see that in 1998, the year of the crisis, the “extra bo-
nus”, which is a payment in the form of profit sharing, is not paid to the work-
force and that wages make up 90% of total compensation even though profits 
remained positive even in 1998 albeit at a lower level than any other year. In 
2002, on the other hand bonuses make up nearly a quarter of total compensa-
tion.  
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4. Wage policies of a Russian firm and the Financial Crisis 
of 1998 
4.1 Introduction 
This section wants to shed light on crucial, but largely unresolved questions 
about the functioning of internal labor markets in general. For example, do 
firms adapt their wage policy to changes in labor market conditions? And if so, 
are all workers affected in the same way, or are incumbent workers shielded 
from external labor market shocks as early theoretical work on internal labor 
markets suggests (e.g. Dunlop. 1957, and Doeringer and Piore, 1971)? 
In particular, we investigate how the firm adjusts employment, wages and 
other components of pay in response to the crisis, and study how the burden of 
the crisis is spread across the workforce. This analysis is important for two 
reasons. First, despite some attempts in the literature to assess the costs of 
economic crises on workers and on households (see, for example, Fallon and 
Lucas, 2002), we know virtually nothing of how these costs are distributed 
among employees inside firms. Second, although several studies have explored 
to what extent internal labor markets cushion incumbent workers from external 
labor market shocks (e.g., Baker et al., 1994a, Lazear, 1999; Lazear and Oyer, 
2004), it is still not well understood how workers’ welfare is affected by firm 
performance over the business cycle. Evidence on the degree to which firms 
are disciplined by external labor market conditions is mixed. What emerges in 
the empirical literature suggests (1) that hiring wages track industry wages, but 
(2) that differences in hiring wages are persistent; indicating that market in-
duced variations in marginal productivity are not fully reflected in wages of 
incumbent workers. 
Since shocks have been small in most industrialized economies, the empiri-
cal literature has found it difficult so far to establish a direct link between 
shocks to (external) labor market conditions and changes of firms’ personnel 
policies. Clearly, there is much insight to be gained by assessing how firms 
react to larger exogenous macroeconomic shocks, such as the financial crisis 
that occurred in Russia in 1998. This crisis lead to a substantial devaluation of 
the Ruble, a collapse of a large part of the private banking sector, a surge in 
inflation and interest rates, and liquidity problems, which adversely affected 
demand in the goods market. 
It is, however, important to note that the Russian financial crisis in 1998 had 
negative effects on economic aggregates only in the short term unlike the still 
ongoing worldwide financial crisis, the effects of which have been long-term 
and strongly spilling over into the real economy. In contrast, in the longer term 
the crisis of 1998 produced beneficial side effects insofar as the real deprecia-
tion of the Ruble and a large fall of real wages were important ingredients in an 
economic process that generated sustained growth of the Russian economy 
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between 1999 and 2008. While our firm had some problems in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis since economic activities in Russia came nearly to a 
standstill for a few weeks after August 1998, in the longer term because of the 
ongoing oil boom and because of a temporary increased competitiveness due to 
the real depreciation of the Ruble the profit situation of the firm improved to 
such an extent that profit levels were higher in 2002 than before the crisis (fig-
ure 1). Nevertheless one needs to keep the assertion by Fallon and Lucas 
(2002) in mind that even if financial crises have depressing effects for the 
whole economy only in the short-term, the consequences of such crises for the 
workforce might be negative in the long-term. The results of our analysis seem 
to confirm this assertion. 
4.2 The most pertinent results 
Our results show that changes in economic conditions strongly influence the 
personnel policies of our firm. Real wages and real compensation fell substan-
tially in the aftermath of the financial crisis as figures 2 and 3 attest. Employ-
ment levels at the firm, on the other hand, remained rather stable (see table 1), 
pointing to a policy that relies on “price” rather than “quantity” adjustment in 
response to an adverse shock, which seems to be typical for the Russian econ-
omy (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). These welfare losses were, however, not spread 
evenly across all employees. In fact, employees at the top of the earnings dis-
tribution tend to take the highest real wage cuts in relative terms as table 3 
shows for the 5 employee categories: employees who found themselves in the 
lower part of the wage distribution in 1997 have a relatively higher real wage 
growth than those who were located in the upper part of the distribution (ac-
countants are the only exception). We show in the paper that this pattern is in 
part driven by external labor market conditions that limit the scope for cutting 
wages of employees at the bottom end of the firm’s wage distribution. 
The findings on real wage changes also contribute to the literature on wage 
rigidity. So far, this literature has documented compelling evidence that man-
agers intentionally refrain from cutting nominal wages (Bewley, 2004). The 
resulting nominal rigidity is borne out in personnel data (e.g., Baker et al., 
1994a; Wilson, 1996 and 1999; Altonji and Devereux, 2000; Dohmen, 2004). 
Clearly, nominal rigidity brings about real rigidity when there is zero inflation. 
In fact, Fehr and Goette (2005) provide evidence from personnel records show-
ing that nominal rigidity even persists in a low growth environment with very 
low inflation, where it limits a firm’s discretion to adjust real wages down-
wards. This indicates that motives for not cutting wages are strong and impor-
tant. However, it is less clear that real rigidity would also stem from strong 
intentions for preserving real wages. Our evidence suggests that such intentions 
are weak: although the firm is reluctant to cut nominal wages, it does not re-
frain from substantially cutting real wages, taking advantage of a high-infla-
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tionary environment. The firm is able to cut real wages because outside oppor-
tunities in the local labor market are substantially reduced after the onset of the 
financial crisis. That local labor market conditions are an important driving 
force of wage and employment policies of our firm is the main focus of the 
second paper to which we now turn. 
Table 3: Real wage growth 1997-2002 by employee category 
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenure in years -0.143** 
[0.069] 
0.013 
[0.011] 
-0.027** 
[0.013] 
-0.239 
[0.157] 
-0.025 
[0.024] 
Tenure 
sqared/100 in 
years 
0.982* 
[0.553] 
-0.082 
[0.066] 
0.141* 
[0.075] 
1.683 
[1.089] 
0.093 
[0.142] 
Tenure 
cube/1000 in 
years 
-0.209 
[0.134] 
0.015 
[0.012] 
-0.019 
[0.013] 
-0.335 
[0.231] 
-0.008 
[0.025] 
Age in years -0.234 
[0.148] 
-0.02 
[0.033] 
0.046 
[0.055] 
-0.532 
[1.170] 
0.914* 
[0.468] 
Age squared/100 
in years 
0.55 
[0.348] 
0.042 
[0.076] 
-0.103 
[0.132] 
1.08 
[2.834] 
-1.978* 
[1.029] 
Age cube/1000 
in years 
-0.042 
[0.027] 
-0.003 
[0.006] 
0.007 
[0.010] 
-0.071 
[0.225] 
0.141* 
[0.075] 
Basic profes-
sional 
0.058 
[0.050] 
-0.460***
[0.146] 
-0.018 
[0.023] 
  
Secondary 
general 
0.004 
[0.052] 
 -0.001 
[0.019] 
  
Secondary 
professional 
0.057 
[0.063] 
-0.012 
[0.026] 
0.028 
[0.024] 
0.172 
[0.447] 
-0.066 
[0.068] 
Higher incom-
plete 
-0.029 
[0.235] 
 0.053 
[0.103] 
-0.011 
[0.813] 
 
Higher 0.125 
[0.163] 
-0.005 
[0.026] 
-0.039 
[0.047] 
0.337 
[0.483] 
-0.025 
[0.068] 
1 if female -0.036 
[0.041] 
0.006 
[0.011] 
-0.111*** 
[0.021] 
-0.29 
[0.427] 
-0.015 
[0.028] 
1 if single -0.247 
[0.230] 
0.031 
[0.075] 
0.139 
[0.087] 
  
1 if divorced or 
widowed 
-0.101* 
[0.056] 
-0.016 
[0.029] 
-0.025 
[0.026] 
-0.441** 
[0.192] 
0.002 
[0.028] 
1 if child -0.066 
[0.051] 
-0.028 
[0.035] 
0.232*** 
[0.073] 
0.067 
[0.166] 
-0.013 
[0.020] 
1 if more than 1 
child 
 -0.012 
[0.039] 
0.219*** 
[0.074] 
  
Position in employee category specific wage distribution: 
1st decile 0.617*** 
[0.085] 
0.403*** 
[0.022] 
0.674*** 
[0.032] 
0.466 
[0.294] 
0.419*** 
[0.041] 
2nd decile 0.287*** 
[0.080] 
0.213*** 
[0.022] 
0.270*** 
[0.029] 
0.264 
[0.275] 
0.278*** 
[0.047] 
3rd decile -0.037 
[0.082] 
0.161*** 
[0.022] 
0.202*** 
[0.034] 
-0.003 
[0.363] 
0.254*** 
[0.043] 
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Table 3 continued… 
4th decile 0.259*** 
[0.008] 
0.085*** 
[0.022] 
0.137*** 
[0.030] 
0.052 
[0.286] 
0.103** 
[0.043] 
6th decile -0.083 
[0.083] 
-0.087***
[0.023] 
0.086** 
[0.035] 
0.107 
[0.310] 
-0.147*** 
[0.045] 
7th decile -0.314*** 
[0.084] 
-0.140 
[0.022] 
-0.033 
[0.031] 
-0.175 
[0.262] 
-0.116*** 
[0.043] 
8th decile -0.550*** 
[0.085] 
-0.186***
[0.023] 
-0.162*** 
[0.034] 
-0.043 
[0.344] 
-0.123*** 
[0.039] 
9th decile -0.621*** 
[0.084] 
-0.189***
[0.022] 
-0.086*** 
[0.030] 
0.0.042 
[0.274] 
-0.158*** 
[0.050] 
10th decile -0.761*** 
[0.084] 
-0.287***
[0.023] 
-0.241*** 
[0.032] 
-0.096 
[0.295] 
-0.268*** 
[0.044] 
Constant 4.054* 
[2.070] 
0.224 
[0.438] 
-1.018 
[0.733] 
8.929 
[16.054] 
-14.044** 
[7.005] 
Observations 
R-squared 
151 
0.83 
611 
0.75 
934 
0.53 
36 
0.69 
92 
0.9 
Standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of basic real wage in rubles – all employees 
 
Source: personnel data base, own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of total real compensation in rubles – all employees 
 
Source: personnel data base, own calculations. 
5. Wage determination and wage inequality inside a Russian 
firm in late transition 
5.1 Introduction 
The literature on Russian labor markets, in particular the literature on wage 
formation and wage inequality, has left many controversial issues unresolved. 
One of the more fundamental issues is the question of which considerations 
drive managers in the wage determination process. Are Russian wages, for 
example, formed mainly by institutional factors related to industrial relations 
and internal labor markets as stressed by Clarke (2002) and Kapelyushnikov 
(2002, 2003) among others, or are managers in their wage decisions mainly led 
by the interplay of conditions in local labor markets, labor market institutions 
and considerations to achieve an optimal level of turnover of the workforce? 
Clarke (2002) takes recourse to two general strands of the literature on wage 
determination, the industrial relations institutional literature and the early litera-
ture on internal labor markets (e.g. Dunlop, 1957, and Doeringer and Piore, 
1971). Both these strands point to the protection of the workforce in the firm 
from shocks that occur in the outside labor market by maintaining a stable and 
“fair” relative wage structure also in times of economic hardship. The second 
approach to the analysis of Russian wage formation extends standard models of 
wage determination in capitalist economies to Russia, and assigns an important 
role to local labor market conditions in the wage formation process. No matter 
how much bargaining power of workers and employers is assumed in the mod-
els underlying the studies, i.e. independent of whether both agents are assumed 
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to have substantial bargaining power as in the studies of Brainerd (2002), Luke 
and Schaffer (2000) and Commander, Dhar and Yemtsov (1996), whether 
employers decide unilaterally over wage levels and structure (Lehmann, 
Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999), or whether the assumption of competitive 
labor markets is maintained (Commander, McHale and Yemtsov, 1995), local 
labor market conditions are assumed to have a major impact on the decision 
making process as well as on outcomes. 
This study provides new evidence on the issue of wage formation and dif-
ferentiation in Russia. If the “industrial relations school” is right, then firms 
that have increasing profits should attempt to maintain real wage levels as 
much as is feasible in times of inflation and reverse real wage losses when 
inflation subsides. And local labor market conditions should play a very subor-
dinate role, if any. We are fortunate to have personnel data for the years 1997 
to 2002, a period that includes an episode of high inflation in the aftermath of 
the August 1998 financial crisis. Given our longitudinal personnel data and the 
profit situation of the firm we are able to provide direct evidence on the validity 
of the prediction put forth by Clarke and others from the “industrial relations 
school” of Russian wage formation. 
To see whether and how important labor market conditions affect wages, we 
need information about the local labor market in which the firm operates. The 
information we use is taken from regional Goskomstat data and from a sample 
of 33 industrial firms in the same region where the firm is active. We also 
interviewed the director general of the firm (CEO), after we had analyzed the 
personnel wage data, to get confirmation or clarification on the motives of 
management regarding its wage policies. 
5.2 Results 
The main results in the final analysis provide little evidence for the prediction 
put forth by Clarke and others of the “industrial relations school”; our results 
rather show that local labor market conditions are one of the main driving 
forces determining management’s wage policies in this Russian firm. In the 
firm at hand, top management, in particular the CEO, unilaterally determine 
wages in spite of official bargaining between management and trade union 
representatives.  
The evolution of average wages in the firm, the region, the sector and the 
economy as a whole is shown in figure 4. Here we can clearly see that the 
average wage in our firm was far higher than in the three aggregates added in 
the figure. We can also make out that after the large drop in the average wage 
in 1999 it remains roughly constant throughout the period while average wages 
in the sector and in the economy at large grow at a steady pace and overtake the 
average wage in the firm by 2003. It is also noteworthy that while the average 
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regional wage also grows it remains well below the firm’s average wage 
throughout the reported years.  
Figure 4: Real Monthly Wage in Thousand 1997 Rubles 
 
Notes: The figure shows average real monthly wages in thousands of 1997 rubles for the firm, 
the region in which the firm is located, the machine building and metal working sector and the 
entire Russian economy.  
Source: Rosstat, own calculations. 
 
From the interview with the CEO it transpired that before the financial crisis 
in 1998, labor turnover was very high in the firm. This turnover was driven by 
voluntary quits as employees saw better opportunities outside the firm. How-
ever, as of 1996 orders for the firm’s products showed a very robust upturn and 
the firm was in desperate need of qualified production workers, engineers, etc. 
To attract these qualified employees and to retain them, top management of-
fered real wages far above the regional and sector averages. After the financial 
crisis of August 1998 outside opportunities in the local labor market were sub-
stantially reduced as we can show with the help of turnover patterns in the firm 
and in the local labor market (see below). This enabled top management to 
extract rents from the firm’s employees through the erosion of real wages and 
real total compensation via the high inflation that manifested itself during and 
after the financial crisis. It curbed earnings most for those who earned the high-
est rents, resulting in a tremendous compression of real wages that was still in 
place at the end of the reported period as the declining Gini coefficients in table 
4 attest. While nominal wages are never cut in this firm, long lasting real earn-
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ings losses were very substantial, and this despite a very strong profit perform-
ance after the crisis (see figure 1). 
The firm was in a position to extract rents from its employees because of a 
fall in outside opportunities in the local labor market after 1999. These falling 
outside opportunities can be shown by the evolution of turnover patterns in the 
period that includes the year of the financial crisis as well as by the dynamics 
of wage differentials between average wages in the firm and average wages in a 
sample of industrial firms in the oblast. Table 5 shows that between 1998 and 
2001 separations fall greatly in our firm while hiring stays roughly constant. 
The same pattern can be observed for the sample of industrial firms in the 
region (see table 6). Differences between average wages in the firm and aver-
age wages in the sample of industrial firms in the oblast become smaller or 
disappear between 1999 and 2002 showing that the rents of the employees in 
our firm are strongly diminished or eliminated (see table 7). However, it is also 
clear that at the bottom end of the firm’s wage distribution there are smaller 
rents before the crisis and the firm seems to pay wages closer to the opportunity 
cost for employees at that end of the distribution throughout the reported pe-
riod. 
Table 4: Evolution of earnings inequality measured by Gini coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel a: Wages 
Year 
Entire work-
force Service staff Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1997 0.2801 0.2474 0.2294 0.2507 0.1912 0.1367 
1998 0.251 0.1484 0.2239 0.2003 0.1417 0.1082 
1999 0.2453 0.0853 0.1954 0.1854 0.1267 0.1202 
2000 0.2456 0.0649 0.1786 0.1945 0.1705 0.072 
2001 0.2189 0.055 0.1679 0.1792 0.1583 0.0438 
2002 0.1995 0.1618 0.1437 0.1725 0.1409 0.0482 
Panel b: Total compensation 
Year Entire work-force Service staff Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1997 0.2928 0.2416 0.2293 0.2456 0.1903 0.1488 
1998 0.2547 0.1474 0.2248 0.2015 0.1423 0.1077 
1999 0.2444 0.0855 0.1964 0.1823 0.131 0.1202 
2000 0.2464 0.0669 0.1792 0.1972 0.1787 0.073 
2001 0.2271 0.0684 0.1681 0.1778 0.1696 0.0447 
2002 0.2211 0.162 0.1455 0.1845 0.1454 0.0484 
Source: Personnel data base, own calculations. 
 350
Table 5: Hiring and Separation Rates (in %) 1997-2002 in our firm 
Year In Out Total 
1998 10.9 12.6 23.5 
1999 11.5 11.2 22.7 
2000 11.2 9.8 21.0 
2001 10.2 7.5 17.7 
Source: Personnel data base, own calculations. 
Table 6: Hiring and Separation Rates (in %) 1998-2001 in sample of regional 
firms 
Year In Out Total 
1998 10.9 12.6 23.5 
1999 11.5 11.2 22.7 
2000 11.2 9.8 21.0 
2001 10.2 7.5 17.7 
Source: CERT Russian regional data base, own calculations. 
Table 7: Differences between average wages in firm and average wages in 
sample of industrial firms in the region in 1997 rubles: 1998-2002. 
Year 
Service 
Workers Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1998 100 133 379 792 1468 
1999 346 391 803 805 1898 
2000 123 -28 261 223 1056 
2001 81 -82 195 279 805 
2002 -61 -24 119 150 551 
Source: Personnel records of the firm, CERT Russian regional data base, own calculations. 
 
In summary, our analysis provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that 
top managers take local labor market conditions into account when deciding on 
wage levels. In times of very high labor turnover they are willing to pay higher 
than average real wages to attract and retain skilled workers. On the other hand, 
being reluctant to cut nominal wages, they relentlessly cut real wages when 
market conditions make this possible. All in all, our evidence clearly shows 
that market forces strongly influence the wage policies of our firm and that 
considerations for a stable internal labor market as mooted by Clark (2002) are 
of less concern. 
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6. The evolution of the gender earnings gap inside a Russian 
firm 
6.1 Introduction 
The gender wage gap has attracted much attention by researchers studying 
labor markets in transition. This research has mainly focused on the question 
whether transition has brought a worsening of women’s position in the labor 
market or whether they have benefited from the liberalization of the economic 
system. In other words, most of the studies analyzing the gender wage gap 
(GWG) in transition countries try to compare the GWG just before the transi-
tion to the gap in the early years of transition. As stressed by Jurajda (2005), 
there are predominantly two countervailing forces determining the dynamics of 
the GWG pre-and post-transition. On the one hand, a dramatic widening of the 
wage distribution, as happened for example in Russia and Ukraine will increase 
the gap since women are above all located in the lower part of the wage distri-
bution (Brainerd, 2000). On the other hand, if low skilled women leave the 
employment state on a large scale, as was observed for East Germany by Hunt 
(2002) and for Slovenia by Orazem and Vodopivec (2000), the gap will be 
reduced. 
Our study on the gender earnings gap (GEG) inside a Russian firm7 for the 
first time uses a panel of personnel data to investigate the determinants of the 
GEG and of its dynamics within a firm in a transition economy.8 Recent work 
with matched employer-employee linked data has shown that firm specific 
effects constitute an important determinant of the GWG (see e.g. the evidence 
for the United States by Bayard et al., 2003; for Spain by Amuedo-Dorantes 
and de la Rica, 2006; and for Germany Heinze and Wolf, 2006). This implies, 
of course, that studies of the GWG that only use household survey data can 
only provide very limited insight into the causes of the GWG, a point vigor-
ously made in Jurajda (2005). 
But even with linked employer-employee data there might arise a problem 
of identification of the key parameters of the model underlying the analysis of 
the GWG since unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role when the 
amount of information on workers and firms is rather limited (Kunze, 2008). 
Studies based on personnel data might provide an interesting contribution to 
the literature by reducing unobserved heterogeneity since the workforce within 
one firm can be considered relatively homogeneous (Kunze, 2008). An interest-
                                                             
7  Thomas Dohmen, Hartmut Lehmann and Anzelika Zaiceva (2008). 
8  The authors look at the gender earnings gap and not at the gender wage gap because they do 
not have precise information on hours worked in the data. They, however, use only full-
time workers in this study in order to minimize biases that might arise because of differ-
ences in the hours worked by men and women. 
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ing study in this context is Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2008) who analyze the 
GWG within a French firm over deciles and link this analysis to the glass ceil-
ing effect. To this purpose they have at their disposal personnel data from an 
aerospace technology firm for 1000 managers and engineers in charge of de-
velopment studies and production. These workers obviously form a rather 
homogeneous group resulting in a small GWG, ranging between 1% at the 
lowest decile to 10% at the highest decile. At any rate, while personnel data can 
never be truly representative of an industry or an economy, they provide a very 
detailed look at internal labor markets that can shed additional light on the 
reasons for the discrepancy in pay between men and women (Ransom and 
Oaxaca, 2005).  
In this paper, we study gender differentials of the whole workforce as well 
as of various employee categories. In Russia, like in other CIS countries, bo-
nuses make up a substantial part of total compensation. We, therefore, analyze 
wage and compensation differentials at the mean of the wage and compensa-
tion distributions as well over the entire distributions. This first study on the 
Russian GEG with personnel data is predominantly a descriptive exercise, 
which wants to show the main patterns of gender differentials across employee 
groups and over time. We, however, also make a first attempt here to get at the 
determinants of the observed patterns and trends of the GEG in this Russian 
firm between 1997 and 2002.  
6.2 The main findings on the evolution of the gender earnings gap 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we document a de-
crease in both gender wage and compensation gaps over 1997-2002 by around 
18 percentage points, which is broadly in line with panel estimation results in 
Kazakova (2007) who employs household survey data for the entire Russian 
economy from the same period. After having performed several decomposi-
tions at the means and quantiles of the wage distribution as well as across time 
we find that at best one third of the total gap is explained by the differences in 
observed productivity characteristics between men and women. We also find 
that, contrary to the early years of transition (see Brainerd, 2000), although the 
largest contribution to the reduction of the gap is due to a narrowing of the 
residual wage distribution, the joint contribution of gender-specific effects has 
the most weight. Regarding quantile analysis, we show that the GEG has 
roughly an inverted U-shape profile across the wage distribution9, that differ-
ences in observable characteristics explain little and that the two highest deciles 
exhibit lower gender wage differentials. The latter result together with an in-
                                                             
9  The inverted U-shape is given for the years 1997 to 2001. In 2002, the GEG is larger at the 
higher quantiles than at the lower quantiles due to a large reduction of the GEG at the lower 
quantiles. Thus in 2002, there seems some evidence of a glass ceiling effect. 
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significant GEG for managers is in line with the theoretical model of Lazear 
and Rosen (1990), which postulates that at particularly high levels of ability 
there exists no GEG, and point towards the existence of segregation within the 
firm. Our analysis also shows that the fall in the gender earnings differential 
between 1997 and 2002 is predominantly driven by a reduction in the differen-
tial in the lower part of the distribution. This in turn is explained by increased 
returns to women characteristics and a slight worsening of men’s characteris-
tics at the bottom of the distribution over the analyzed years.  
Since the largest earnings differentials are observed for production workers, 
in the second part of the paper we focus on this group of employees and ex-
plore the reasons behind the GEG, in particular segregation, in more detail. For 
these workers we observe job levels that are linked to their jobs, which we use 
in our analysis. We find that neither wage arrears, nor benefits or job security 
reasons seem to explain the existence of earnings differentials within this firm. 
However, two striking results emerge. First, the gender earnings gap is al-
most completely explained by the job levels. For workers we have information 
on 6 auxiliary levels and 8 primary levels only for the year 2002. We should, 
therefore, understand our analysis as a largely descriptive exercise. Comparing 
Machado-Mata decompositions of gender earnings differentials at the quantiles 
with and without conditioning on job levels leads to the same conclusion: earn-
ings differentials across job levels are large and little of the earnings differen-
tial is explained by characteristics, while earnings differentials within job levels 
are much smaller and virtually entirely explained by observed characteristics at 
all quantiles (see figure 5). Of course, we are aware of the endogeneity of job 
levels in the determination of earnings and consequently do not suggest that job 
levels have a causal impact on the gender earnings differential. Nevertheless, 
our descriptive exercise points to the remarkable fact that there is such a large 
earnings differential in spite of a seemingly gender neutral wage policy of top 
management in this firm, which arises because women are in overwhelming 
numbers placed in low paying job levels (cf. Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005). 
The second striking result is that female workers are concentrated in low-
level jobs and are underrepresented (or even absent) in high-level jobs. This 
can be clearly seen in table 8. Female workers find themselves located above 
all in the lowest categories of auxiliary job levels and are completely absent 
from the highest categories in the primary job levels. It is also apparent that 
only in the job level primary 4 can we observe a statistically significant gender 
earnings gap (in the level primary 5 it is significant at the 10% level), while in 
all other job levels average pay is the same for female and male production 
workers. So, women finding themselves in the same job levels as men for the 
most part do not seem to be discriminated against in terms of pay. 
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Table 8 – Earnings and segregation into levels of production workers by gender 
for 2002 
 Males Females Gap 
Auxiliary 1 n.a. 0.459 (0.118) n.a. 
[1.00] 
Auxiliary 2 n.a. 0.642 (0.218) n.a. 
[1.00] 
Auxiliary 3 0.738 (0.172) 
0.726 
(0.143) 
0.012 
(0.029) 
[0.85] 
Auxiliary 4 0.796 (0.154) 
0 .795 
(0.159) 
0.001 
(0 .059) 
[0.90] 
Auxiliary 5 1.028 (0.147) 
1.020 
(0.128) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
[0.83] 
Auxiliary 6 1.260 (0.475) 
1.267 
(0.335) 
-0.007 
(0.324) 
[0.67] 
Primary 1 0.466 (0.075) n.a. n.a. 
[0] 
Primary 2 0.803 (0.205) 
0.857 
(0.146) 
-0.054 
(0.065) 
[0.04] 
Primary 3 1.053 (0.248) 
1.143 
(0.207) 
-0.090 
(0.056) 
[0.04] 
Primary 4 1.284 (0.223) 
1.131 
(0.343) 
0.153*** 
(0.056) 
[0.08] 
Primary 5 1.429 (0.148) 
1.326 
(0.153) 
0.103* 
(0.062) 
[0.03] 
Primary 6 1.605 (0.153) n.a. n.a. 
[0] 
Primary 7 1.622 (0.167) n.a. n.a. 
[0] 
Primary 8 1.630 (0.035) n.a. n.a. 
[0] 
Notes: “Auxiliary” and “primary” refer to the hierarchical job levels of production workers in 
the firm. The table reports unconditional means (and their standard deviations) of monthly 
wages in each level by gender, differences of these means (and their standard errors) across 
gender and the proportion of women in each level [in square brackets]. * difference is signifi-
cant at 10%; *** difference is significant at 1%. 
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Thus, females self-select or are selected into lower paid jobs and segregation 
seems to be a potential reason behind the GEG in this internal labor market. 
However, in order to gain further insights into the driving forces of this appar-
ent segregation, we need to take a closer look at promotion dynamics for men 
and women as well as hiring decisions and entry-level jobs, issues that will be 
pursued in future by analyzing the data for this firm spanning the years 1990 to 
2006. 
7. Conclusions  
Having a rich personnel data set of one Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 
at our disposal, we trace out the evolution of wages, total compensation and 
employment in three studies, covering a period that included an episode of high 
inflation during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1998. The ob-
served evolution points to “price” rather than “quantity” adjustment within the 
firm during the crisis as employment remained stable but real wages and real 
compensation fell substantially. Our evidence thus shows that the firm did not 
refrain from substantially cutting real wages, taking advantage of a high-
inflation environment.  
The downward adjustment of earnings led to persistent welfare losses 
among employees since real wages and real compensation levels had not re-
covered to pre-crisis levels by 2002, even though the firm’s financial situation 
was then better than before the crisis. The firm, which was a high-wage firm 
prior to 1998, made use of the high inflation that manifested itself during and in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis in order to extract rents from employees. 
These welfare losses were, however, not spread evenly across all employees, 
since the firm curbed earnings most for those who earned the highest rents, 
resulting in a tremendous compression of real wages. 
The firm was in a position to extract rents from its employees because of a 
fall in outside opportunities in the local labor market as evidenced by dramati-
cally falling separation rates after 1999. At the bottom end of the firm’s wage 
distribution there are, however, smaller rents before the crisis and the firm 
seems to pay wages closer to the opportunity cost for employees at that end of 
the distribution throughout the reported period. 
Our analysis provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that top managers 
take local labor market conditions into account when deciding on wage levels. 
In times of very high labor turnover they are willing to pay higher than average 
real wages to attract and retain skilled workers. On the other hand, being reluc-
tant to cut nominal wages, they relentlessly cut real wages when market condi-
tions make this possible. All in all, our evidence clearly shows that market 
forces strongly influence the wage policies of our firm and that considerations 
for a stable internal labor market are of less concern. 
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We have also analyzed the size of the gender earnings gap and its determi-
nants and development over time. The estimates of the gender earnings gap at 
the firm level are very similar in magnitude to estimates of the gender gap in 
the economy at large. Moreover, the development of the gender earnings diffe-
rential over time also mirrors developments in the Russian economy. Observed 
characteristics that are related to individual productivity only explain a small 
fraction of the gender earnings gap. The narrowing of the gap at the firm level 
which is more pronounced at the lower part of the earnings distribution is to a 
minor degree driven by gender differences in separation patterns. In particular, 
men who are in the lower part of the earnings distribution but have relatively 
favorable observed characteristics are more likely to separate, most likely be-
cause they face better outside alternatives. Women in the lower end of the 
earnings distribution have lower separation rates. This is likely the result of an 
increase in the rewards to female characteristics, which is particularly prevalent 
in the lower part of the distribution. Our estimates indicate that this increase in 
the rewards for women is the main driving force behind the falling gender 
earnings gap. 
Equally important, our analysis reveals that the gender earnings gap is 
largely driven by job assignment rather than by earnings differentials within a 
particular job level. For production workers, we have shown that earnings 
differentials conditional on the job level are small and in general statistically 
insignificant to start with and almost entirely explained by observed character-
istics related to productivity. 
The three studies that we have surveyed in this paper look at the internal la-
bor market of one Russian firm in late transition by analyzing its wage and 
employment policies as well as its gender earnings gap. This analysis will be 
complemented in future work when we will look at the internal labor markets 
of several firms in Russia and Ukraine throughout the entire transition period, 
employing even richer personnel data sets. The three presented studies, how-
ever, nicely set the stage for this future more comprehensive research, where 
we intend to cover all the issues sketched in the introduction.  
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